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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES H. POWERS, 
Plaintiff ~ Appellant, 
vs. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH & SALT LAKE CITY 
CORPORATION, 
Defendants ~ Respondents. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
10587 
The appellant in this action claims disability con-
sisting of the aggravation of a pre-existing heart con-
diton by reason of an accident arising out of or in the 
course of his employment as a fireman for Salt Lake 
City Corporation. 
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STATEMENT OF PACTS 
'1 
I 
The facts as set forth in the appellant's brief have i 
been carefully selected to present the most favorable! 
impression for his position in this appeal thereby re-
quiring this respondent to point out the evidence whic!1 
has been omitted in the appellant's statement of facts. 
i 
The appellant claims that he suffered an accident 
in the course of his employment as a fireman for Salt 
Lake City on September 25, 1963, which resulted in 
his total disability commencing on April 7, 1964. The I 
alleged "accident" of September 25, 1963, consisted 
of responding to a fire alarm at I :39 A.M. on that date 1 
from Fire Station No. 4. He testified that he had gone 
to bed about 10:30 P.M. and that he felt weak and dizzy 
as he got out of bed to respond to the fire alarm. 
(R. 38-39). He put on his "hurryups" (pants and 
boots which are kept at the side of his bed for fast dress·' 
ing) and responded to the tailboard of the fire engine, 
(R. 39). He was sleeping on the main floor of the fire 
station and ran 40-50 feet from the dormitory to the 
back of the truck. (R. 51-52, 120). As they pulled 
out of the fire station he had severe pains in his abdomen 
above his diaphragm and extending to his shoulder, 
(R. 39). About two blocks from the station he lapsed 
into unconsciousness and the next thing he remem· 
bered he was sitting on the tailboard of the truck at 
the address of the reported fire having dry heaves. 
(R. 40). The fire alarm was a false alarm and the appel· 
lant did not engage in any firefighting activity on that 
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occasion. (R. 122). He was taken back to the fire 
station in Captain Donaldson's car where he was ad-
yised by his superior officers to go home but he refused 
to do so because he did not want to upset his wife and 
disturb her rest. (R. 40-41). He also testified that 
his wife was having female trouble and the doctor didn't 
know whether it was malignant or non-malignant and 
that he was worried about her condition. (R. 42-43). 
Subsequent testimony revealed that Mrs. Powers had 
a tumor in her uterus which was diagnosed by Dr. Carl 
T. w· oolsey at the very beginning of September in 
1963, that she decided to have it removed by surgery 
in November, but the actual operation was delayed 
until after the Christmas holidays and that she didn't 
know until after the operation in January or February 
whether she might have had cancer or not. (R. 116-
llS). 
Mr. Powers continued to perform his duties as 
a fireman following the incident on September 25, 
1963. Although he testified that he continued to have 
chest pain which was less severe than the above epi-
sode, he did not seek medical attention until March 
16, 1964, at which time he first consulted with Dr. Null. 
(R. 42-43). On April 7, 1964, he was hospitalized 
after passing out and has been disabled since that time. 
(R. 44-45). 
Contrary to established procedure, the Industrial 
Commission Referee permitted the appellant to present 
medical evidence from Dr. Francis Clyde Null at the 
3 
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original hearing prior to referring the case to a medicali 
panel as required by law. (R. 15-16). Dr. Null testj.i, 
I 
tied that he first saw Powers on March 16, 1964, anu 
I 
his examination revealed that Powers was afflicted win' 
an electrocardiographic abnormality designated as the 
Wolff-Parkinson-White syndrome and was suffering: 
from an atherosclerotic heart disease, commonly called 
hardening of the arteries, with an associated severe. 
anginal syndrome. (R. 18). It was also established: 
thereafter that Powers had a high blood fat level. (R!, 
19). Dr. Null testified that the pain Powers complainedi 
of was caused by an insufficient blood supply to thei 
heart muscle and is called angina pectoris. (R. 19).
1 His pain is directly related to, and is a consequence of, 
his having atherosclerotic heart disease. (R. 20-21).j 
Dr. Null testified that atherosclerotic heart disease is! 
a process whereby the arteries become narrowed witl1 1 
fat and calcium deposits greatly diminishing the blood! 
supply to the heart muscle. (R. 23). He testified that 
the pain suffered by such a patient is only a symptom i 
of the disease, that the disease itself is a pre-existing 
condition which necessarily existed prior to the time 
that the pain became apparent, that the artery restric·. 
tion caused by the fatty deposition occurs over a con· I 
siderable period of time, and that it is very unlikely' 
that stress or exercise would be the sole cause of this 
disease. (R. 28-29). He stated that chronic stress and 
chronic anxiety tend to greatly accentuate the symp· 
toms in this particular disorder. (R. 24). It was his· 
opinion that the events described by Powers as occur·: 
4 
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ring on September 25, 1963, did aggravate his under-
lying heart disease. (R. 26). Dr. Null testified that the 
question of whether Powers suffered a myocardial 
infarction on April 7, 1964, when he was hospitalized, 
was raised but that they were not able to show conclu-
sively that he had sustained any severe injury to the 
heart muscle itself. (R. 21). Subsequent to that occur-
rence, however, he had increasing limitation of activity 
to the point of being unable to do ordinary work. (R. 
21). 
Following the original hearing the case was referred 
to a medical panel consisting of Dr. L. E. Viko, Chair-
man, Dr. Irving Erschler and Dr. Kenneth A. Crock-
ett, to investigate the medical aspects of the appellant's 
claim. ( R. 7 4) . The chairman of this panel secured a 
complete medical report from Dr. Null, including elec-
trocardiagrams. (R. 78-80). In that report Dr. Null 
reported that the pain suffered by Mr. Powers in March, 
1964, could be induced by intense emotional aggrava-
tion, exercise or sexual intercourse. His patient at that 
time related the incident of September 25, 1963, but 
stated that he had suffered "infrequent" pain subse-
quent thereto until January of 1964, when the pain 
became much more frequent causing him to seek medi-
cal attention. Dr. Null noted in his report that " ( i) t 
was significant that a brother age 40 years had severe 
coronary artery disease and another brother age 37 
years was said to have heart disease which had not been 
known to be associated with either metabolic disease or 
obesity,'' and that "his mother age 59 years had heart 
5 
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disease of an unspecified type." In that report Dr. 
Null stated: 
"Subsequent to the initial observation Mr. 
Powers was felt to exhibit not only the Wolff. 
Parkinson-White Syndrome on ~ congenital 
basis but also hypercholesterolemia and a syn-
drome of angina pectoris presumedly associated 
with premature atherosclerosis on the basis of 
hypercholesterolemia." (Emphasis added.) 
With permission from Dr. Null, the chairman of 
the medical panel reviewed the appellant's St. Marks 
Hospital record resulting from his admission on April 
7, 1964, and prepared a summary of that record. (R 
81-82). It is interesting to note that the hospital record 
stated that the appellant was well until two months be· 
fore atlmission, when he had the onset of squeezing, pre· 
cordial pain with radiation to the ulnar side of the left 
arm which was known to be associated with Woolf· 
Parkinson-White syndrome and familiar hypercho· 
lesterolemia, the patient's own serum cholesterol being 
approximately 400. The discharge summary was to the 
effect that a man with k1wwn atherosclerotic heart du· 
1 
ease of 3 months duration and a family history includ· 1 
ing two brothers who have arteriosclerotic heart disease 
showed no positive evidence of a myocardial infarc! 
in serial electrocardiograms. Dr. Viko also reviewed 
the electrocardiograms. 
Based upon the foregoing, the medical panel made 
its report to the State Industrial Commission whicl1 
was concurred in by each member of the panel. (R. 
6 
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86-88). In that report the panel concluded as follows 
with respect to its evaluation of the medical aspects 
of this case : 
"In view of the fact that the Panel finds no 
evidence of a myocardial infarction from the epi-
sode of September, 1963, and even granting that 
an attack of angina pectoris may have been pre-
cipitated by the occupational events of that eve-
ning, the Panel finds it hard to accept the idea 
that the occupational events of that evening and 
the attack of that evening were sufficient to ag-
gravate pre-existing coronary-artery disease to 
the point of progressive and disabling heart dis-
ease. The subsequent events after September, 
1963, may reasonably be explained as part of the 
natural course of coronary artery disease." 
At a hearing on appellant's objections to the report 
of the medical panel in this case, Dr. Viko testified that 
the panel had considered the entire file and transcript 
in this matter, together with Dr. Null's letter to the 
medical panel and the hospital record which he had 
reviewed and summarized. (R. 97-98). He also testi-
fied that all three doctors on the panel had reviewed 
the entire file and assisted in dictating the final report. 
(R. 98). 
Following the hearing on appellant's objections 
to the medical report the referee referred the entire 
matter back to the medical panel on the question of 
aggravation of a pre-existing heart condition. (R. 
122). The medical panel submitted its second report 
in which it reiterated its conclusion in the original report 
7 
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and concluded that the material brought out at tlw 
second hearing would not change the opinion of tht 
panel. (R. 125-126). The matter was then submitteu 
to the State Industrial Commission without further 
hearing upon the stipulation of the appellant's counsel 
( R. 132) . The Commission received the reports of th1 
medical panel in evidence and adopted such reports in 
denying the appellant's claim. (R. 138). Petition for 
rehearing was denied ( R. 140) and appellant brought 
this appeal on a petition for writ of certiorari. (R. 141· 
145). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DENIAL OF APPELLANT'S CLAH! 
WAS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
The appellant lays much weight upon the state-
ment of the Industrial Commission that there was no 
"unusual exertion or unusual emotional stress" involved 
in the incident of September 25, 1963, upon which the 1 
appellant relies as constituting the "accident" in the 
course of his employment which entitled him to work· 
men's compensation benefits. The fallacy of the appel· 
lant's argument in this regard arises from the fact that 
the sole question to be decided in this case was whether 
the occupational events on the date in question were 
of such nature as to aggravate a pre-existing heart con· 
8 
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dition to the point of progressive and disabling heart 
disease. In other words, was there a causal connection 
between the disability and the occupational events? 
This the Industrial Commission found contrary to the 
appellant's contention and its finding was fully sub-
stantiated by the medical panel report upon which it 
relied. The medical evidence in this case clearly estab-
lished that the disability suffered by Mr. Powers was 
the result of a progressive type of heart disease and the 
pain suffered by him had been precipitated by a dimin-
ishing blood supply to the heart muscle caused by the 
narrowing of the supplying arteries through the depo-
sition of fat and calcium therein. Appellant's own 
doctor, Dr. Null, testified that pain was only a symptom 
of the disease and that the underlying cause of the pain 
had been developing over a considerable period of 
time. Even Dr. Null recognized that it required "acute 
strenuous exercise" and "acute emotional upsets" to 
aggravate the heart condition of one predisposed to 
atherosclerosis. (R. 24). He even ref erred to the de-
velopment of pain in the appellant on the night in 
question as the result of "acute exertion of that mo-
ment." (R. 30). It thus becomes apparent that the 
question of aggravation of the pre-existing heart con-
dition in this case and the causal relationship between 
the occupational events and the disability of the appel-
lant does indeed involve "unusual exertion" as a factor 
in the case. In this light the medical panel found that 
the appellant's disability which developed six months 
following the claimed accident could "reasonably be 
9 
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explained as part of the natural course of coronan 
artery disease" even assuming that the occupation;! 
events had precipitated an attack of angina pector
1
, 
on September 25, 1963. 
The appellant cites the case of Purity Bisc11;it Com. 
pany v. Industrial Comrnission, 115 U. 1, 201 P.2d 961 
as authority for the abolition of the unusual strain test 
in workmen's compensation cases in Utah. But in s11 
doing the appellant carefully omitted the court's obser 
vations relating to causal connection between the worl 
and disability. Thus at page 969 of 201 P.2d Reporter 
the main opinion states as follows: 
" * * * We again wish to make it clear that w1 
do not intend to dispense with that requirement 
that in a case of this kind where the employe1 
suffers an internal bodily failure or breakdmrn 
the burden is on the applicant to show that th1 
exertion was at least a contributing cause there· 
of. In other words, we are not abandoning tht 
requirement that in cases where disease or in· 
ternal failure causes or is the injury there musi 
be a causal connection between the employmen' 
and the injury." 
In a concurring opm1on m that case Justice Wolff 
addressed himself to the very problem involved in tl11 
instant case at page 970 of 201 P.2d Reporter: 
"The first requisite for the payment of com· 
pensation under the Workmen's Compensatio11 
Act is that the injury which caused the disabilit1 
must have been employment connected.*** But 
compensation cannot be paid merely because tl11 
10 
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disability or death occurred in the duration of the 
employment. 'In the course of his employment' 
connotes more than in the duration of the em-
ployment. Functions performed by the em-
ployee in furtherance of the industry in which 
he is employed must be a material contributing 
factor to the death or disability. The problem of 
the Commission in these cases where the dis-
ability or death occurs by an internal failure 
contemporaneous with exertion attendant upon 
the work or soon thereafter, is to determine 
whether the exertion was a causative factor of 
the death or injury or merely coincidental with 
the employment. When the exertion is compara-
tively mild and of ~ kind which usually attends 
the kind of work the employee has been doing 
and disability or death results, then it would 
appear to me that the proof that it was a material 
contributory factor to death or disability should 
be clear and convincing. The more mild the 
exertion, the more likely that the internal fail-
ing was merely coincidental. If, on the other 
hand, the death or disability occurs contempo-
raneously with or soon after an extraordinary 
exertion performed in the course of employment, 
there would appear to be a more definite basis 
for an inference that the work was a paramount 
contributing cause. * * * In the case of Dee 
Memorial Hospital Ass'n v. Ind. Comm., 104 
Utah 61, 138 P.2d 233, the employee was exert-
ing himself beyond the point called for by his 
usual work. The pains which ensued and which 
it was later found bv consultation with the doctor 
indicated a corona;v heart disorder and which 
required prolonged ~est were tied into the work 
of moving fairly heavy boxes and 100 pound 
sacks of fire clay. Had those same pains come 
11 
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during exertion in his usual work, the problem~ 
of determining whether that exertion had aggra-
vated a previously existing heart disease or tht 
aggravation was simply the result of a normal 
progression of the heart disease might have bee11 
more difficult, but it would still have been for 
the commission to resolve." 
Justice Wolfe had this to say in determining whether. 
the Industrial Commission has acted unreasonably or 
arbitrarily in doubtful cases of internal injury: 
"Where the death or disability occurs under 
such circumstances as to present prima facie 
doubt as whether it was caused by exertion inci·' 
dental to the work, or an event which occurred 
only in the duration of the work and in regard 
to which the work furnished no material or 
efficient concurring or cooperating cause, then. 
before a favorable award is made, it should 
appear by cJear and convincing evidence that 
the exertion in pursuance of the work was at 
least an efficient cooperating cause of the dis· 
ability or death. 'fhe commission should haw 
clear and convincing proof that the exertion 
done as part of the work, whether ordinary or 
extraordinary, was a factor which materiall) 
contributed to or caused the death or disability. : 
The question of the causal connection between 
appellant's disability and the occupational events oi 
September 25, 1963, certainly was a matter to be de 
cided by the Industrial Commission in this case an~ 
the "clear and convincing" evidence claimed by the ap· 
pellant to require a reversal of the commission's order 
simply does not exist. It should be borne in mind thni 
12 
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the disability in this case did not occur until six months 
after the claimed accident, during which time the appel-
lant did not seek medical assistance. Furthermore, the 
appellant was confronted with a constant worry relat-
ing to his wife's health from a time preceding the date 
in question until January or February thereafter when 
surgery revealed her condition to be non-malignant. 
The hospital records at the time Powers was hospital-
ized in April, 1964, indicate that the patient's condition 
was atherosclerotic heart disease of 2-3 months dura-
tion which certainly is not consistent with his claim that 
his disability was precipitated by his work more than 
6 months previous thereto. The same hospital records 
confirmed Dr. Null's findings of similar heart disease 
in two brothers of the appellant. The evidence of exer-
tion indicated that Powers had only to slip into his 
hurryups, run 40-50 feet to the truck and climb on the 
tailboard of the truck which was considerably less physi-
cal activity than his usual occupational duties for the 
fire department. Under these facts, together with the 
entire medical record involved, the medical panel, con-
sisting of three doctors whose knowledge, experience 
and professional competency certainly qualified them 
for their assignment, agreed that in their opinion the 
occupational events of that evening were insufficient 
to aggravate Powers' pre-existing coronary artery dis-
ease to the point of progressive and disabling heart 
disease and that his subsequent disability could reason-
ably be explained as part of the natural course of coro-
nary artery disease. It should be noted that the "un-
13 
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disputed" evidence claimed by the appellant to sustain 
I 
I 
I 
his position consists of the medical opinion of Dr. Null 
based solely upon the same background of facts as abow 
1 
set forth, for Dr. Null did not see the patient until' 
six months after the incident involved. The medical 
panel adopted Dr. N ull's diagnoses in this case which 
were made after his first examination of Powers in 
1964, but they did not agree with his opinion as to the ' 
causal relationship between the occupational events of 
September 25, 1963, and Powers' subsequent disability 
which occurred on April 7, 1964. The Industrial Com· 
mission accepted the opinion of the 3-man medical panel 
rather than the opinion of Dr. Null which it had every 
right to do. i 
The appellant also misconceives the function of/ 
the medical panel in a case such as this. His argument 
seems to proceed upon the premise that the panel itself 
is the referee or judge in the dispute and must accept: 
the opinion of Dr. Null as the "undisputed" medical 
evidence of cause and effect. Of course, this is absurd. 
Under Section 35-1-77, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
it is mandatory for the Industrial Commission to refer 
the medical aspects of a case such as this to a medical 
panel to make such study and report as it may deter· 
mine. Under that statute the report of the medical 
panel can be considered as evidence in the case by the 
commission and the medical panel report was receired ! 
in evidence in this case. Thus it was for the commission 
to determine from all the medical evidence before it the 
causal relationship between the employment activities 
14 
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of the appellant and his subsequent disability. The rule 
has been firmly established in this court that, where 
the evidence is conflicting as to whether an accident 
arose out of or in the course of the employee's employ-
ment, the finding of the commission will not be reviewed. 
on appeal. Norris v. Ind,ustrial Commission, 90 U. 256, 
61 P.2d 413; Commercial Casnalty Insurance Co. v. 
Industrial Commission, 71 U. 395, 266 P. 721; Callahan 
v. Industrial Commission, 104 U. 256, 139 P.2d 214. 
CONCLUSION 
It is submitted by this respondent that the order 
of the Industrial Commission denying appellant's claim 
was supported by the evidence and should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HOMER HOLMGREN 
Salt Lake City Attorney 
JACK L. CRELLIN 
Assistant Salt Lake City Attorney 
414 City and County Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION 
15 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
